There's no crystal ball, but this researcher from Rice University is trying to see if some metrics work for economic forecasting. Photo via Getty Images

Research by Rice Business Professor K. Ramesh shows that the Fed appears to harvest qualitative information from the accounting disclosures that all public companies must file with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

These SEC filings are typically used by creditors, investors and others to make firm-level investing and financing decisions; and while they include business leaders’ sense of economic trends, they are never intended to guide macro-level policy decisions. But in a recent paper (“Externalities of Accounting Disclosures: Evidence from the Federal Reserve”), Ramesh and his colleagues provide persuasive evidence that the Fed nonetheless uses the qualitative information in SEC filings to help forecast the growth of macroeconomic variables like GDP and unemployment.

According to Ramesh, the study was made possible thanks to a decision the SEC made several years ago. The commission stores the reports submitted by public companies in an online database called EDGAR and records the IP address of any party that accesses them. More than a decade ago, the SEC began making partially anonymized forms of those IP addresses available to the public. But researchers eventually figured out how to deanonymize the addresses, which is precisely what Ramesh and his colleagues did in this study.

"We were able to reverse engineer and identify those IP addresses that belonged to Federal Reserve staff," Ramesh says.

The team ultimately assembled a data set containing more than 169,000 filings accessed by Fed staff between 2005 and 2015. They quickly realized that the Fed was interested only in filings submitted by a select group of industry leaders and financial institutions.

But if Ramesh and his colleagues now had a better idea of precisely which bellwether firms the Fed focused on, they still had no way of knowing exactly what Fed staffers had gleaned from the material they accessed. So the team decided to employ a measure called "tone" that captures the overall sentiment of a piece of text – whether positive, negative, or neutral.

Building on previous research that had identified a set of words with negatively toned financial reports, Ramesh and his colleagues examined the tone of all the SEC filings accessed by Fed staff between one meeting of the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) and the next. The FOMC sets interest rates and guides monetary policy, and its meetings provide an opportunity for Fed officials to discuss growth forecasts and announce policy decisions.

The researchers then examined the Fed's growth forecasts to see if there was a relationship between the tone of the documents that Fed staff examined in the period between FOMC meetings and the forecasts they produced in advance of those meetings.

The team found close correlations between the tone of the reports accessed by the Fed and the agency’s forecasts of GDP, unemployment, housing starts and industrial production. The more negative the filings accessed prior to an FOMC meeting, for example, the gloomier the GDP forecast; the more positive the filings, the brighter the unemployment forecast.

Ramesh and his colleagues also compared the Fed's forecasts with those of the Society of Professional Forecasters (SPF), whose members span academia and industry. Intriguingly, the researchers found that while the errors in the SPF's forecasts could be attributed to the absence of the tonal information culled from the SEC filings, the errors in the Fed’s forecasts could not. This suggests both that the Fed was collecting qualitative information that the SPF was not—and that the agency was making remarkably efficient use of it.

"They weren’t leaving anything on the table," Ramesh says.

Having solved one mystery, Ramesh would like to focus on another; namely, how does the Fed identify bellwether firms in the first place?

Unfortunately, the SEC no longer makes IP address data publicly available, which means that Ramesh and his colleagues can no longer study which companies the Fed is most interested in. Nonetheless, Ramesh hopes to use the data they have already collected to build a model that can accurately predict which firms the Fed is most likely to follow. That would allow the team to continue studying the same companies that the Fed does, and, he says, “maybe come up with a way to track those firms in order to understand how the economy is going to move.”

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This article originally ran on Rice Business Wisdom and was based on research from K. Ramesh is Herbert S. Autrey Professor of Accounting at Jones Graduate School of Business at Rice University.

Equity options can act as an alternative to credit default swaps for detecting a company’s credit risk. Photo via Getty Images

Rice research explains a new way to measure default risk for investors

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Up until the 2007-2009 financial crisis, credit default swaps (CDS) were a predominant method for predicting the probability of corporate default. CDS function like insurance for loan assets — if an asset defaults, the bank who purchased the CDS would recoup their loss. Higher-risk assets usually have higher premiums, and in this way the price of a CDS indicates the probability of default.

When the housing market crashed in 2007, the CDS market crashed along with it when banks had to pay out more than they had expected. The CDS market is not expected to ever return to its previous high, leaving a void in market-driven estimates for determining an asset’s default probability.

To fill that void, a team of researchers including Rice Business Professor Robert Dittmar created an alternative method for measuring default risk: equity options data. The team found that equity options not only correlate with CDS data in terms of accurate prediction of default but also provide additional insights on what types of assets are more likely to default, and when they will default.

There are two types of options, a call option, which is essentially a bet that a stock’s price will be higher than a contracted value (the strike price) and a put option, which is a bet that a stock’s price will be less than a contracted value.

A put is often viewed as an insurance contract — if you hold a stock, but also a put option on it, you limit your loss on the stock if the stock price falls.

“What we are looking at is essentially how expensive put options get,” says Dittmar. “If the market thinks a company is likely to default, it expects that its stock value will fall (almost to zero). As a result, put options, which represent insurance against this loss become more expensive. We are looking at how these option prices change to see if they inform us about the probabilities of default.”

According to Dittmar and his team, this approach has several advantages. 1) There are more stocks with options than CDS. 2) The CDS market is drying up whereas the option market remains liquid. And 3) Because of the nature of an option contract, and the fact that in principle equity holders have the lowest claim on a company’s assets, this approach may allow investors to predict losses in case of default.

The team looked at CDS quotes on 276 firms between 2002 and 2017, focusing attention on entities that had quote data available on one-year credit default swaps. The 15-year sample enabled the researchers to analyze the money lost through defaults over a longer period of time, including the 2007-2009 financial crisis.

Using equity options data as a predictor of default led to some interesting insights. First, there are two components that investors in corporate bonds think about when weighing default risk — the probability of default and (should there be a default) how much of the bond’s principal they will get back (i.e., recovery rate). “What we see is that credit ratings imply different levels of default thresholds, which may mean that investors believe that there are differences in the amount that debt holders will lose in the case of default,” says Dittmar.

Second, option-implied default probabilities correlate to historical changes in the economy. Default probabilities are higher in bad economic times and for firms with poorer credit ratings and financial positions. Default spikes are more likely during times of economic turbulence, such as the financial crisis of 2007-2009, which correlated with the decline of the CDS market after an onslaught of debt defaults during the recession. Assets are less likely to default during times of economic expansion. Over the period of 2013-2017, forecasted losses through defaults hovered around 15%.

The research sample ends in 2017, and the paper was published in 2020, about a month after the start of the coronavirus pandemic. Since then, there have been unprecedented changes in the economy, and some economists are anticipating another recession in 2023. With such instability in the market, multiple methods of predicting losses should be especially relevant. This research suggests that the equity options market may provide additional ways of finding the probability of these losses.

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This article originally ran on Rice Business Wisdom and was based on research from Robert Dittmar, professor of finance at the Jones Graduate School of Business at Rice University.

Earnings report delays generally lead to drops in stock prices. Disclosure can soften this market reaction. Photo via Getty Images

Houston research: Is no news always bad news in market reports?

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Investors eagerly wait for the news in their earnings reports. When these reports don't appear on the expected date, investors worry — and stock prices often fall as a result. But what if managers could present late reports in a way that spared their companies?

Research by K. Ramesh, a professor at Rice Business, shows that managers' approach to late earnings reports can profoundly affect market reaction. When firms put off filing a report, it's up to managers to decide whether to speak up or stay quiet. Those who choose to talk about a postponement then must decide how, what and how much to say.

All earnings delays, whether they're attended by a statement or not, prompt negative market reaction, prior research suggests. But in his research, Ramesh, Herbert S. Autrey Professor of Accounting, wanted to learn more about the exact consequences of these late reports, and how managers can lessen the blowback.

To do this, Ramesh and a team of coauthors first looked at the incidence, timing and contents of a comprehensive sample of press releases announcing an earnings delay. Then they studied what those delays did to market value.

Conventional wisdom in the business press already suggested that investors viewed any announcement of a delayed earnings report as bad news. But finance theorists tell a more complicated story, one in which the market response might be partially shaped by managerial behavior. Subtle factors, they found, such as whether the impending delay is discussed or treated with silence, really can make a difference.

In the view of some theorists, merely announcing a delay can sometimes avert a drop in stock prices. Others argue that this isn’t necessarily the case, especially if the company discloses that the delay stemmed from legal concerns. The better approach: making it clear up front that reports aren't being postponed to hide disastrous information. But what if the information is indeed disastrous?

That may be the one case where disclosure won’t change much, Ramesh and his team found.

“Those companies that are in fact concealing disastrous results will experience no benefits (in the form of higher stock price) from revealing their true situation,” the research team wrote, “because the market will infer the worst from the manager’s decision not to announce the delay.” For this reason, they added, delayed earnings without a stated explanation prompt the most negative market reaction. As in so many areas of public relations, without a narrative, investors will infer a negative one of their own.

To better understand the impact of late reports, Ramesh and his coauthors built a comprehensive sample of 545 delay announcements by using a keyword search of the Dow Jones Factiva database between January 1, 1995, and December 31, 2009.

As conventional wisdom suggested, the study showed that announcements of late earnings reports led to negative market reactions. (Earlier studies have shown smaller firms are hit hardest by this dynamic, perhaps because investors assume large companies have more finely tuned financial reporting systems, so are less worried by their earnings delays).

Consistent with the anecdotal evidence, the average one-day abnormal stock return for the sample was -6.29 percent, while the median return was -2.27 percent. Both figures are economically and statistically significant.

The researchers next classified the announcements according to stated reason, dividing the delays into “Accounting” and “Non-Accounting” categories. “Accounting” explanations were subdivided into “Accounting Issue,” “Accounting Process” and “Rule Change.”

Meanwhile, “Non-Accounting” explanations were divided into “Business,” which linked the delay to some event such as divestitures or regulatory proceedings, and “Other,” which ranged from earthquakes to power outages. Finally, there were delays for no stated reason at all.

About two-thirds of the late announcements, the team found, were linked to accounting. When firms named a specific accounting issue as the cause for delay, the average abnormal return reached a statistically significant -8.15 percent. When managers explained that the accounting process was not complete, the average abnormal return was slightly lower, at -7.04 percent.

After accounting issues, business events drove most earnings delays. In theory, these events could have been either good or bad news. But the average abnormal return for the subsample was a statistically significant -3.74 percent — a reflection of the fact that most business events linked to late earnings reports tend to be negative.

Curiously, the average abnormal return for the grouping classified as “Other” was almost nil — at 0.53 percent. This suggests that the market does not penalize managers for events outside of their control that have little, if any, relevance to firm performance.

“No Reason,” the researchers found, was the most damaging explanation of all. Seven percent of the sample, or 37 out of 545 delays, came without a stated reason. The average abnormal return for these was a significant -10.41 percent, a greater negative number than the returns for any of the other reasons.

So what should managers do when a deadline is going to be busted? Bite the bullet and disclose the reasons, Ramesh suggests. For one thing, it helps limit legal exposure and preserve credibility. When the reason for the late report is innocuous, explaining to investors can also mitigate the market's displeasure. A caveat: While informing investors that a power outage caused earnings delay will calm jitters, disclosure may not make a difference if the company just can’t balance its books.

It's human nature, apparently, to read no news as bad news. Relaying something—anything—about the cause of a late report seems to soothe investors' nerves by preventing them from filling the silence themselves.

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This article originally ran on Rice Business Wisdom and was based on research from K. Ramesh, Tiago Duarte-Silva, Huijing Fu and Christopher F. Noe. K. Ramesh is the Herbert S. Autrey Professor of Accounting at Jones Graduate School of Business at Rice University.

Research shows that some corporate executives skew earnings to influence the market and inflate share price. Photo via Pexels

Rice University research finds market outliers at risk of misreporting

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Say a company called CoolConsumerGoodsCo has just released its quarterly earnings report, revealing significantly higher profits than its consumer goods industry counterparts.

That result might spur analysts to slap a buy rating on the stock and investors to snap up shares. In an ideal world, the market wouldn't have to consider the possibility that the numbers aren't legit — but then again, it's not an ideal world. (Enron, anyone?)

Rice Business professors Brian R. Rountree and Shiva Sivaramakrishnan, along with Andrew B. Jackson at UNSW in Australia, studied what makes business leaders more likely to engage in fraudulent earnings reporting. Specifically, they focused on the relationship between this kind of misrepresentation and the degree to which a company's earnings are in line with the rest of its industry — a variable the researchers term "co-movements."

Many people are familiar with a similar variable, calculated using stock returns often referred to as a company's beta. The authors adapted the stock return beta to corporate earnings to see how a company's earnings move with earnings at the industry level.

The researchers hypothesized that the less in sync a company's earnings are with its industry, the higher the chance a company's leaders will manipulate earnings reports. They started with the well-accepted premise that corporations try to skew earnings reports to influence the market. The primary motive is typically to raise the company's stock price, as when an executive tries to "choose a level of bias" that balances potential fallout of getting caught against the benefits of a higher stock price.

To test their prediction, the professors analyzed a sample of enforcement actions taken by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission against companies for problematic financial reporting from 1970 to 2011 — although they noted that given the SEC's limited resources, the number of enforcement actions probably underestimates the actual amount of earnings manipulation in the market.

Their analysis revealed that firms with low earnings co-movements (meaning their earnings were out of sync with industry peers) were more likely to be accused by the SEC of reporting misdeeds. They concluded that the degree of earnings co-movement determines the probability of earnings manipulation. Put another way, earnings co-movements are a "causal factor" in the chances of earnings manipulations — and to a significant degree. The researchers found that firms who don't co-move with the market are more than 50 percent more likely to face an SEC enforcement action, compared with firms who are perfectly aligned with the market.

The researchers drilled deeper into the data to study whether the odds changed depending on the industry, since past research has indicated that the amount of competition in an industry works to constrain misreporting. That premise seems to hold true, the researchers concluded. In industries with more competitive markets, the impact of low co-movement on earnings manipulation is moderated.

They also studied whether the age of a firm played a part in the likelihood of earnings manipulation. Newer firms often rely more on stock compensation, which could be a motive for manipulating earnings reporting to drive up share price. Indeed, younger firms were more susceptible to misreporting when their earnings were out of whack with the rest of the marketplace.

Every firm faces some risk of misreporting, however. Even for public companies under analyst scrutiny, low co-movement proved to be a driver of earnings manipulation. But companies known for conservative reporting tend to be less likely to exaggerate their earnings, in general; these firms typically recognize losses in a more timely manner, the professors found.

These findings suggest a number of future lines of research. For example: When do executives underreport earnings? And can analyzing patterns related to cash flow reporting help better isolate earnings manipulation?

In the meantime, if you come across a company like CoolConsumerGoodsCo with an earnings report that's widely out of sync with the rest of its industry, you might think twice before rushing to buy in.

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This article originally ran on Rice Business Wisdom and is based on research from Brian R. Rountree, an associate professor of accounting at the Jones Graduate School of Business at Rice University, and Shiva Sivaramakrishnan is the Henry Gardiner Symonds Professor of Accounting at Rice Business.

John Berger, CEO of Houston-based Sunnova, is this week's Houston Innovators Podcast guest. Courtesy of Sunnova

Houston solar energy exec shines light on company growth and IPO

HOUSTON INNOVATORS PODCAST EPISODE 15

It was all about the timing for John Berger, founder and CEO of Sunnova, a Houston-based residential solar energy company.

When he founded his company in 2012 in Houston, solar energy wasn't the trendy sustainability option it is today, but Berger saw the potential for technology within the industry. So, with a lot of perseverance and the right team behind him, he scaled Sunnova through nationwide expansion, billions of money raised, and a debut on the stock market last July — something that also happened with great timing.

About 72 hours after Sunnova went public last July, the Federal Reserve System announced it was going to cut rates. Additionally, Sunnova's IPO occurred ahead of WeWork's failed IPO.

"We went public in a market that still isn't back open again, I think, for IPOs," Berger says on this week's episode of the Houston Innovators Podcast. "We had pretty good timing when we went out the door."

However great the timing was, Sunnova's success is built on the hard work and skills of the company's employees, Berger explains on the podcast, and now running a public company requires a dynamic leader.

"I really look at myself and how I can change myself," Berger says. "I'm a different CEO today than I was 12 months ago, and hopefully I'll be a different CEO in 12 months, because the company demands it."

In the episode, Berger lifts the curtain on Sunnova's IPO, explains where he sees the solar energy industry headed, how battery storage technology has evolved, and why he's not worried about who ends up in the White House. Listen to the full episode below — or wherever you get your podcasts — and subscribe for weekly episodes.


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Houston space tech startups share latest updates on lunar missions and more

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Houston-based space tech companies Axiom Space and Intuitive Machines recently shared updates on innovative projects and missions, each set to launch by 2027.

Axiom Space

Axiom Space, developer of the world’s first commercial space station and other space infrastructure, is gearing up to launch two orbital data center nodes to low-earth orbit by the end of 2025.

The Axiom Space nodes will lay the foundation for space-based cloud computing. Axiom says orbital data centers provide cloud-enabled data storage and processing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning directly to satellites, constellations, and other spacecraft in Earth’s orbit. This innovation will reduce reliance on earth-based systems, enhance wireless mesh networks and improve real-time operation of space-borne assets, according to Axiom.

Axiom has been working on the development of orbital data centers since 2022. The two nodes going into space in 2025 will be part of Kepler Communications’ 10-satellite data relay network, which is scheduled to launch by the end of this year. Axiom Space and Kepler Communications have been collaborating since 2023.

Kam Ghaffarian, co-founder, executive chairman, and CEO of Axiom, says his company already has deals in place with buyers of space-based cloud computing services. Orbital data centers “are integral to Axiom Space’s vision of era-defining space infrastructure, unlocking transformational capabilities and economic growth,” he says.

Axiom Space says it will be able to buy additional payloads on Kepler’s network to boost capacity for orbital data centers. The two companies will team up to provide network and orbital data center services to various customers.

Intuitive Machines

Meanwhile, Intuitive Machines, a space exploration, infrastructure and services company, has picked SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket to launch its fourth delivery mission to the moon. The launch will include two lunar data relay satellites for NASA.

Intuitive Machines says its fourth lunar delivery mission is scheduled for 2027. The mission will comprise six NASA commercial lunar payloads, including a European Space Agency drill set designed to search for water at the moon’s south pole.

“Lunar surface delivery and data relay satellites are central to our strategy to commercialize the moon,” Intuitive Machines CEO Steve Altemus says.

The first of five lunar data relay satellites will be included in the company’s third delivery mission to the moon. The fourth mission, featuring two more satellites, will be followed by two other satellite-delivery missions.

Houston doctor aims to revolutionize hearing aid industry with tiny implant

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“What is the future of hearing aids?” That’s the question that led to a potential revolution.

“The current hearing aid market and technology is old, and there are little incremental improvements, but really no significant, radical new ideas, and I like to challenge the status quo,” says Dr. Ron Moses, an ENT specialist and surgeon at Houston Methodist.

Moses is the creator of NanoEar, which he calls “the world’s smallest hearing aid.” NanoEar is an implantable device that combines the invisibility of a micro-sized tympanostomy tube with more power—and a superior hearing experience—than the best behind-the-ear hearing aid.

“You put the NanoEar inside of the eardrum in an in-office procedure that takes literally five minutes,” Moses says.

As Moses explains, because of how the human cochlea is formed, its nerves break down over time. It’s simply an inevitability that if we live long enough, we will need hearing aids.

“The question is, ‘Are we going to all be satisfied with what exists?’” he asks.

Moses says that currently, only about 20 percent of patients who need hearing aids have them. That’s because of the combination of the stigma, the expense, and the hassle and discomfort associated with the hearing aids currently available on the market. That leaves 80 percent untapped among a population of 466 million people with hearing impairment, and more to come as our population ages. In a nearly $7 billion global market, that additional 80 percent could mean big money.

Moses initially patented a version of the invention in 2000, but says that it took finding the right team to incorporate as NanoEar. That took place in 2016, when he joined forces with cofounders Michael Moore and Willem Vermaat, now the company’s president and CFO, respectively. Moore is a mechanical engineer, while Vermaat is a “financial guru;” both are repeat entrepreneurs in the biotech space.

Today, NanoEar has nine active patents. The company’s technical advisors include “the genius behind developing the brains in this device,” Chris Salthouse; NASA battery engineer Will West; Dutch physicist and audiologist Joris Dirckx; and Daniel Spitz, a third-generation master watchmaker and the original guitarist for the famed metal band Anthrax.

The NanoEar concept has done proof-of-concept testing on both cadavers at the University of Antwerp and on chinchillas, which are excellent models for human hearing, at Tulane University. As part of the TMC Innovation Institute program in 2017, the NanoEar team met with FDA advisors, who told them that they might be eligible for an expedited pathway to approval.

Thus far, NanoEar has raised about $900,000 to get its nine patents and perform its proof-of-concept experiments. The next step is to build the prototype, but completing it will take $2.75 million of seed funding.

Despite the potential for making global change, Moses has said it’s been challenging to raise funds for his innovation.

“We're hoping to find that group of people or person who may want to hear their children or grandchildren better. They may want to join with others and bring a team of investors to offset that risk, to move this forward, because we already have a world-class team ready to go,” he says.

To that end, NanoEar has partnered with Austin-based Capital Factory to help with their raise. “I have reached out to their entire network and am getting a lot of interest, a lot of interest,” says Moses. “But in the end, of course, we need the money.”

It will likely, quite literally, be a sound investment in the future of how we all hear the next generation.